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Introduction
It is widely believed that, if one of the superpowers resorted to the use of nuclear wea pons, the subsequent exchanges might well escalate to all-out nuclear war.
It is also widely be lieved that neither superpower can hope, by attacking the nuclear forces of the other, to el iminate the possibility of its own destruction. These beliefs are major deterrents to the use of nuclear weapons. The U.S. defense posture vis a vis the Soviet Union in Europe, the Persian Gulf, and elsewhere is, however, based on another premise: that the U.S. is willing, if necessary, to initiate the use of nuclear weapons to stop the Soviet Union from crossing certain imaginary lines that have been drawn around areas the U.S. considers to be of "vital interest."
In order for this threat of first nuclear use to be credible to the Soviets, however, it is first necessary to convince ourselves that the benefits would outweigh the costs.
This may ex plain why there is little discussion in the of ficial literature of the considerations that might discourage the use of nuclear weapons.
The principal subject of this paper is one of these neglected areas:
the unintended immediate casualties among civilians that would result from the use of nuclear weapons on military targets. The longer-term effects are discussed in subse quent chapters.
In these estimates we take ac count of the likely effects of short-term radi ation fallout of the type described by Upton in chapter 5 but we do not consider the long-term fallout effects on people or on ecosystems as out lined in chapters 5 and 6.
The casualty figures discussed in this chapter are therefore on the very low side, and provide a minimum to which should be added estimates of the broader environ mental effects. We discuss here the civilian fa talities that would result from the use of nuclear weapons for several cases that we and others have analyzed in some depth:
• Battlefield use in the Germanies (East and West) against conventional forces such as tanks; • Use on the "theater" level-also in the Germanies--against medium-and intermedi ate-range nuclear weapon systems and nucle ar warhead storage depots; • Use against missile silos, bomber bases, and nuclear naval support facilities in the U .S .; and • Use against the cities of the superpowers.
Battlefield Use of Nuclear Weapons
Any major conflict on the conventional level between the superpowers would bring with it the 20 danger that the losing side would resort to battlefield nuclear weapons.
In Europe, this threat of "escalation" is implicit in the deploy ment of thousands of short-range nuclear warheads and delivery systems by the NATO and WTO (Warsaw Treaty Organization) forces.
According to the U.S. Army Field Manual (U.S. Army, 1982), U.S. battlefield nuclear systems are designed for use against • Enemy nuclear delivery systems.
• Key command and control elements.
• Support forces in the rear of committed elements.
• Follow-on or deep-echeloned forces; and • Reserves.
Battlefield nuclear systems range from atomic demolition mines, with explosive yields on the order of ten tons (0.01 kiloton) TNT equivalent, to bombs carried by tactical fighter-bombers, with yields of over one million tons (one megaton) TNT equivalent.
Between these extremes in both yield and range are nuclear artillery shells and shortrange surface-to-surface ballistic missiles (Cochran et a l ., 1983).
The Field Manual also describes how NATO use of these weapons would be authorized in "pack ages :" A package is a group of nuclear weapons of specific yields for use in a specific area and within a limited time to support a speci fic tactical goal. Each package must contain nuclear weapons sufficient to alter the tact ical situation decisively and to accomplish the mission.
The 1976 edition of the Field Manual gives as an example a package consisting of 2 atomic demo lition mines (ADM), 30 rounds of nuclear artil lery, 10 surface-to-surface missiles, and 5 airdelivered bombs (see Fig. 2-1 ).
Efforts would, of course, be made in planning and targeting such a set of nuclear warheads to minimize "collateral damage" to populated areas. This would be hard to do.
The most-discussed hypothetical nuclear battlefield in the world in Europe and the most heavily nuclearized region in Europe is the two Germanies.
The average popu- And the largest circle shows the area in which unshielded persons would receive large enough radiation doses to cause death from radiation illness within two months (von Hippel, 1983). lation density of this area is 200 persons per square kilometer, with one populated place per four square kilometers (Arkin et al., 1982) . Ad ditional targeting difficulties would flow from the fact that roads naturally pass through these cities, towns, and villages and therefore so would many of the military units that would be the tar gets of battlefield nuclear weapons.
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In many cases, the roads between towns would be crowded with refugees. Finally, attacking military forces might use urban and refugee "hugging" tactics so as to discourage the use of battlefield nuclear weapons against themselves (Bracken, 1979). Under these circumstances, and assuming short-term fallout effects of the magnitude speci fied in chapter 5, more than a million civilian deaths could result from the use of battlefield nuclear weapons at a militarily significant level.
Even a one-kiloton neutron bomb would ex pose an area of about 5 square kilometers, popu lated in the Germanies by an average of 1000 people, to radiation doses in the lethal range (see Fig. 2-2) , and it would require more than one thousand such explosions to immobilize a signifi cant fraction of the 20,000 tanks that might be involved in a full-scale battle between NATO and WTO forces in the Germanies (Arkin et a l ., 1982) .
Unfortunately, it is not clear that nuclear planners understand the horrendous carnage that would result from the use of even the lowest-yield nuclear warheads on the battlefield. According to Paul Bracken (1979), much of U.S. nuclear planning is based on the results of computerized war games that predict thousands, not millions, of civilian fatalities from the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield.
He reports that these very low fa tality numbers are obtained because the computers are programmed to assume that there are no refu gees on the roads and to treat Soviet forces as automata who cross in to West Germany and advance directly into [unpopulated] NATO nuclear killing zones. Here they are detected and destroyed by the lowest yield nuclear weapon capable of doing the job.
Command and control difficulties, confusion, false targeting and other problems are simply assumed away . . . What actually prevents either side from getting too close to the 4000 towns and cities in Germany is a collection of Fortran statements (Bracken, 1979).
Preemptive Use of Nuclear Weapons in Europe
Clearly, the consequences for civilian popu lations of even the use of relatively low-yield nuclear weapons on the battlefield could be cata strophic. And, it is quite possible that, in a crisis so severe that it resulted in the crossing of the nuclear threshold, the use of nuclear wea pons would spread from the front lines.
Indeed, both superpowers have deployed in Europe mediumand intermediate-range (up to about 5000 km for the Soviet SS-20 missile) nuclear weapon systems to back up their short-range battlefield nuclear systems. There are approximately 2000 warheads on land-and submarine-based missiles with ranges greater than 150 km in and around Europe plus nuclear bombs for an estimated 2500 nuclearcapable fighter-bombers and medium-range bombers. These warheads range in yield from about one kiloton to more than one megaton (Arkin et a l ., 1982). There are, to our knowledge, no official es timates of the civilian casualties that might re sult from the use of a significant fraction of these theater nuclear weapons on their intended targets.
In order to gauge the possible conse quences, therefore, an independent calculation was recently undertaken.
The scenario examined in volved an attack limited to the nuclear targets in the above list located in the Germanies (Arkin et al., 1982) . This target set comprised a total of 171 surface-to-surface missile sites, military air bases and nuclear weapons storage depots (see Fig. 2-3 ). It would be natural to give these tar gets the highest priority since they pose the greatest destructive threat to the opposing forces in this region. It was assumed that each would be targeted by one or two 200-kiloton warheads.
The resulting civilian casualties in the two Germanies were estimated to range from 1.5-11 mil lion deaths (7-25 million total casualties). The low figures were obtained by assuming that one 200-kiloton warhead exploded at an altitude of 2 kilometers over each target-too high to cause local fallout.
The high figures were obtained by assuming attacks with two warheads--one air-burst and one ground-burst-on each target. This latter type of attack was assumed for "time urgent" tar gets such as nuclear air bases by NATO planners in a recent war-game (Campbell, 1981).
Thus, even the very limited use of theater nuclear weapons assumed in this scenario against purely military targets would leave a large frac tion of the 76 million people living in the two Germanies dead and injured.
These casualty esti mates do not include the deaths that would result from the radioactive fallout carried by the wind into neighboring countries.
( Fig. 2-4 shows the projected fallout pattern from the groundbursts using "typical June winds.") Nor do they include longer-term deaths, such as those from radiationinduced cancers, exposure, starvation, and epi demics .
Once again, the attacks envisioned in this scenario are very restrained-both in terms of the types of targets attacked and the small fraction of the available nuclear arsenal used.
This re straint does not seem very plausible. All of the land-based nuclear delivery systems in Europe are vulnerable to nuclear attack, and the initiation of nuclear warfare would result in enormous pres sures being put on nuclear decision-makers to "use them or lose them. lation to the use of long-range "strategic" nucle ar weapons against targets located in the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
Indeed, a principal argument for the deployment of U.S. cruise and Pershing II missiles in Western Europe is that, since these weapons can reach deep into the Soviet Union, they will make it even more difficult to limit nuclear war to Central Europe.
At the intercontinental level, the highest priority targets for each side would once again be the nuclear forces of the other side.
In fact, much of the history of the nuclear arms race is that of efforts by each side to make the other side's nuclear weapon-systems more vulnerable to attack while trying to decrease the vulnerability of its own. The MX missile, for example, was ori ginally intended both to increase the U.S. threat to Soviet ICBMs and to be less vulnerable than ex isting U.S. Minuteman missiles to attack by those same Soviet ICBMs.
As we have seen, almost no official infor mation has been made available to the public about the civilian fatalites that could result from the use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield or theater levels.
More information has been made available in the case of intercontinental attacks against strategic nuclear forces, however, because of a controversy triggered in 1974 when the Secre tary of Defense, James Schlesinger, argued that the U.S. should be better prepared to respond "to a limited attack on military targets that caused relatively few civilian casualties" (Schlesinger, 1974).
The idea that a nuclear attack on the U.S. would not inevitably kill vast numbers of people was a novel one.
Schlesinger was The shaded areas are those in which the radiation levels would be high enough to cause severe radiation illness (Arkin etal., 1982) .
When
Secretary
Schlesinger returned in September, he reported estimates that the civilian casualties resulting from an all-out Soviet "counterforce attacks" against U.S. ICBM silos, strategic bomber bases, and nuclear navy bases might total about one million (U.S. Sen. For.
Rel. Comm., 1974b).
The Senators were still not satisfied, however, and asked the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) to set up an outside review of the assumptions that had been made in the DOD calculations.
Ultimately, as a result of the OTA group's criticisms, the DOD ana lysts revised many of their assumptions with the result that their fatality estimates rose into the range of 3-16 million (U.S. Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 1975) .
Below, we consider separately the DOD's fa tality estimates for attacks against the three sets of nuclear targets which were considered: ICBM silos, strategic bomber bases, and nuclear naval bases.
We will discuss both the extent to which they were revised as a result of the expert panel1s criticisms and the extent to which we find even the revised estimates to be an inadequate re presentation of the potential consequences of these nuclear attacks.
Attacks on ICBM Fields
The bulk of the warheads involved in an at tack against U.S. strategic nuclear forces would be thrown against the ICBM force-currently 1000 Minuteman missiles and approximately 50 Titan II missiles--and their associated launch-control facilities.
These missiles and launch-control facilities are distributed across the Great Plains and Southwestern U.S. in six major and three minor missile "fields" (see Fig. 2 
-5).
Since these missile fields are generally lo cated in relatively sparsely populated areas, the blast and heat of Soviet warheads exploding over them would cause relatively few civilian casual ties.
The missile silos and launch control cen ters are so hardened, however, that in order to subject one to sufficient overpressure to destroy it, a nuclear warhead would have to be exploded at such a low altitude that the fireball would touch the ground.
As a result, such dirt and debris would be sucked up into the fireball, be contami nated with fission products, and subsequently fall 30 to earth as radioactive fallout downwind from the target. Most of the fatalities associated with attacks on U.S. ICBM silos were found to be due to radiation doses from this fallout.
When Schlesinger first returned to brief the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on counter force attacks, he described an attack on U.S. ICBM's in which a single one megaton warhead was exploded at its "optimum height of burst" over each silo and the resulting fallout was carried downwind by "typical August winds."
The DOD ana lysts also assumed that, by the time the fallout had reached the cities downwind a few hours later, the residents would have all found places in the best available below-ground fallout shelters and that they would have the discipline and supplies to stay there for about two weeks. With these as sumptions, the DOD's computers found that an at tack on U.S. ICBM's would result in about 800,000 fatalities (U.S. Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 1974b).
The review committee found some of these as sumptions to be optimistic, however, and therefore suggested that the DOD recalculate its numbers with different, more realistic assumptions. The SS-18 missile, which has re placed the SS-9, has also been flight-tested with a single heavy warhead, although most are believed to carry 8-10 lighter warheads (Tinajero, 1981). Cumulative radiation doses inside intact houses in the shaded areas would ex ceed 450 rads. The radiation dose-lethality curve shown in Fig. 2-6 indicates that a 450 rad dose would result in approximately a 50 percent fatali ty rate in the exposed population.
Attacks on Nuclear Bomber Bases
A Soviet counterforce attack would also be expected to target the 19 U.S. Strategic Air Com mand (SAC) bases that are the permanent bases for U.S. intercontinental nuclear bombers and the ad ditional SAC bases that host the tanker aircraft that would refuel these bombers during their mis sions or would act as dispersal bases during a crisis (Berman and Baker, 1982). Fig. 2-7 shows the locations of the 46 SAC bases to which these missions were assigned in 1974 (U.S. Sen. For.
RADIATION DOSE (ERD IN RADS)
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Rel. Comm., 1975; see, also, Air Force Magazine, 1982). Some of these SAC bases are located quite close to urban areas.
The blast and heat from nuclear explosions over these air bases would therefore result in many more casualties than would be the case for the relatively isolated mis sile silos.
Below, we attempt to reproduce the DOD estimates of civilian fatalities from nuclear attacks on these air bases and then explore some of the uncertainties in the assumptions used in making these estimates.
The DOD Fatality Estimates
In his September 1974 testimony, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger presented estimates indicating that 300,000 fatalities would result if a single one megaton warhead were exploded at an "optimum height-of-burst" above each of the 46 SAC bases shown in Fig. 2-7 .
The only other information given was that "August winds" and "maximum utili zation of existing civil defense facilities" had been assumed and that "the fatality level is 450 REM's or 7 psi, etc." (U.S. Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 1974b). Although Schlesinger's statement about "fata lity levels" is rather cryptic, a 450 REM wholebody radiation dose is the level at which approxi mately one half of the population would contract fatal radiation sickness.
(See Fig. 2-6 . Rems may be taken equivalent to rads in this case.) It is only natural to infer from Schlesinger's state ment, therefore, that the DOD used a similar curve for the blast effects of nuclear explosions with the 50 percent fatality level being reached at approximately 7 pounds per square inch (psi)1 peak overpressure. This is, in fact, a characterisitic of the fatality probability versus-overpressure curve which can be derived from the curve shown in Fig.  2-8a (Oughterson and Warren, 1956 ) giving the probability of death as a function of distance from ground zero at Hiroshima.
(The low "tail" on the fatality curve beyond 3 km in Fig. 2-8a pre sumably reflects an imperfection in the survey iBecause of its nearly universal usage in the nuclear-weapons-effects literature, we have not converted pounds per square inch into metric units in the text. One psi = 0.0689 Bars. used and has been suppressed in our parameter ization of the curve.) Fig. 2-8b shows this fa tality curve replotted as a function of peak ground-level overpressure.
It has been assumed that the yield of the Hiroshima bomb was 15 kilotons (Loewe and Mendelsohn, 1982) and that its height-of-burst was 500 meters (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977).
Note that the 50 percent fatality level is indeed reached at approximately 7 psi. It is virtually certain that the DOD used a curve such as that in Fig. 2-8b to make its estimates of the casualties due to the blast and heat effects of nuclear explosions. Fig. 2-9 shows the total cumulative popu lation as a function of distance from the 46 SAC bases shown in Fig. 2-7 (FEMA, 1983) .
It will be seen that approximately six million people live within 10 miles of these bases.
Given the re lationship in Fig. 8b between the probability of death and peak blast overpressure, and given curves for this overpressure as a function of height-of-burst and distance from ground zero for a one megaton explosion (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977), one can calculate the total number of fa talities around the 46 SAC airbuses as a function of height-of-burst.
The results are shown in Fig. 2-10 , 1956 ) where the small "x" symbols indicate the total mor tality rate at different distances from ground zero, "x-1" the mortality rate due to burns among people in the open directly exposed to the fireball, and "x-2" the mortality rate from ionizing radiation among people shielded from the termal radiation.
The dashed curve in Fig. 2-8a indicates the total incidence of mor tality plus severe injury. appears that, as with their initial assumptions about the likely characteristics of a Soviet at tack on U.S. ICBM silos, the DOD analysts chose a height-of-burst for the attack on the SAC bases that would limit civilian fatalities in exchange for some lessening of the desired military ef fect.
As Fig. 2-10 shows, if the height-of-burst had been lowered to approximately 3 kilometers, where the area subjected to overpressure greater than 3 psi (and therefore the military effective ness of the attack) would be maximized, the esti mated number of deaths would have more than tripled to about one million. This is not the whole story, however. As will be shown below, it was inappropriate for the DOD to assume that the level of fatalities resulting from one megaton airbursts high over U.S. bomber bases would be the same function of overpressure as the fatalities that resulted from a 15 kiloton airburst over Hiroshima.
Heat Effects
In Hiroshima, the heat from the fireball was intense enough to give most unsheltered people fa tal skin burns out to distances of 2 kilometers (Oughterson and Warren, 1956). The amount of heat energy deposited on an exposed surface facing the explosion at this distance was about 8 cal/cnr and the peak blast overpressure was 3.5 psi.
It would take a somewhat greater intensity from a one megaton airburst (about 11 cal/cm2) to be as damaging because of the longer duration of the thermal pulse (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977). If the one megaton explosion occurred at an altitude of 5 kilometers on a clear day, the thermal radi ation intensity would exceed this level out to ap proximately 13 km from ground zero. At this dis tance, however, the corresponding peak over pressure would be only about 1.5 psi-too low according to the overpressure model shown in Fig. 8b to cause a significant percentage of deaths.
It appears, therefore, that in this case the heat effects of the nuclear explosion must be explicitly taken into account. fact that, at distances closer than 1 km to ground zero at Hiroshima, people not shielded by thick walls were exposed to lethal doses of gamma radi ation from the explosion. Most of these people would, however, have been killed by blast or burn effects in any case.
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For nuclear explosions of higher yields, the lethal range of the "prompt" nuclear radiation emitted by the explosion would be buried still deeper within the area of lethal blast and heat effects.) At one extreme of our family of fatality models is the "DOD model," corresponding to the curve in Fig. 8b in which all deaths are assumed to be due to overpressure (blast) effects. At the other extreme, we assume that all the deaths at Hiroshima were due to heat.
We then have a parameterization of the curve in Fig. 8c as the probability of Death due to Heat
PDH = 1 -exp[-.69*(19*f/H)1,3] ,
where H is the heat intensity in cal/cm2. The factor f is equal to unity for a nuclear explosion with the yield of the Hiroshima bomb but must be increased for greater yields to take into account the decrease in burn-effectiveness of the thermal radiation of the associated longer thermal pulse (Glasstone and Dolan, 1977). Fig. 2-11 shows the fatality levels predicted by the two extreme models for a one megaton war head exploded at an altitude of 5 kilometers, as a function of distance from ground zero. It will be seen that the thermal effect model would predict a much higher number of fatalities in this case than the overpressure model used by the DOD-even though the parameters of both models are fixed to predict the same distribution of fatalities for the yield and height-of-burst of the Hiroshima weapon.
Between the extreme models, we have a spec trum of models obtained by taking their weighted 001 where w, the weighting factor, can take any value in the range between zero (DOD overpressure model) and unity (heat model).
Given a one megaton airburst at a height of 5 kilometers above each of the 46 SAC bases, the corresponding fatality predictions range from the DOD's value of 300,000 to 1.85 million.
It is unclear what value of w might give the most "realistic" model. A value of w = .2, corre sponding to a fatality prediction of about 600,000, might seem appropriate if one assumed that 20 percent of the population would be exposed to direct thermal radiation effects-either out doors or near windows indoors. Higher values of w would be appropriate if the heat radiated by the fireball caused firestorms well beyond the areas of serious blast effects.
In either case, it appears that the failure to explicitly consider heat effects in the DOD fatality model was a major omission.
Pattern Attacks
In its critique of the original DOD casualty calculations, the Office of Technology Assess ment's review group questioned the assumption that only one nuclear warhead would be used to attack each SAC bomber and tanker base.
The panel sug gested that it was more likely that the areas around each of the bases would be "pattern" at tacked with a number of warheads in order to try to destroy in the air as many as possible of the aircraft that had taken off on warning of attack (U.S. Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 1975).
The DOD re sponded by estimating the number of fatalities that would result from pattern attacks on the SAC bases but buried its results in the consequences of a more comprehensive attack. We have therefore made our own estimates, using the set of fatality models described above. This corre sponds to an area of aircraft destruction 7-16 times as large as that which had been given for a single one megaton warhead attack (2-3 nm [3.7-5.6 km] radius).
We have therefore estimated the number of fa talities that would be caused by a pattern attack by assuming airbursts of 7-16 one megaton warheads distributed over a circle of 8 nm (15 km) in a ra dius around each of the 46 SAC bases. We have al so simplified our calculation by assuming an aver age probability of death throughout this circle equal to the average probability of death through out this circle equal to the average probability of death in a circle under a one megaton airburst with a radius of 3.7 km (16 warhead case) or 5.6 km (7 warhead case). Deaths that would occur out side the 15 km radius have been neglected. With these assumptions and an assumed height-of-burst of 5 km, we estimate 1.0-1.6 million fatalities with the DOD's overpressure model (w = 0) and 5.3-6.4 million fatalities with the pure thermal effects model (w = 1).
Ordinarily, in discussions of counterforce attacks against the U.S., it is assumed that the escape time of the bombers and tankers would be minimized by striking their bases with warheads launched from submarines located as close as pos sible to U.S. shores.
In this context, the bar rage attacks discussed above would appear implaus ible because the number of one megaton warheads required (322-736 for 46 SAC bases) is too large to be delivered by the small number of Soviet bal listic missile submarines ordinarily on patrol near the U.S. Some of the newer Soviet submarine-launched missiles, however, appear to have multiple war heads of smaller yield. The SS-N-18, for example, is believed to be equipped with seven warheads, each with an estimated yield of 300 kilotons (Tinajero, 1981). At a height-of-burst of about 2 km, seven 200 kiloton warheads would be able to cover as large an area with peak-blast over pressures in excess of 3 psi as the seven one megaton warheads exploded at 5 kilometers in the hypothetical pattern attacks discussed above.
In such a case, only one SS-N-18 missile would be required for a pattern attack against each of the 46 SAC bases for a total of 46 missiles in all-about as many as could be carried by three of the Soviet Union's 13-plus Delta III class submarines (Jane1s Fighting Ships, 1982-83) .
We have therefore estimated the consequences of a pattern attack with an SS-N-18 missile on each of the 46 SAC bases and find 1.6 million deaths using the overpressure model and 0.4 mil lion using the heat model.
(The prediction of the overpressure model is higher in this case because of the lower altitude of burst.)
If one of the seven warheads were ground-burst for the purpose of cratering and radioactively contaminating the runway of each base, there would be an additional 40,000 fatalities from radioactive fallout (assum ing "typical March winds").
Our conclusion from the above discussion is that the DOD's original estimates of the civilian fatalities from a nuclear attack on U.S. bomber and tanker bases were too low-but by a factor that is quite uncertain.
Attacks on Nuclear Navy Bases
In peacetime, nearly half -of U.S. ballistic missile submarines, (and therefore over 2000 U.S. strategic warheads) are located in four ports: Groton, Connecticut? Charleston, South Carolina; King's Bay, Georgia? and Bangor, Washington (Cochran et a l ., 1983) .
Other potential counter force targets would be bases hosting attack sub marines, aircraft carriers, and other ships carry ing nuclear weapons that could be used to attack the Soviet Union or its navy.
There are at least six such nuclear navy bases in the continental U.S. in addition to the four bases hosting ballis tic missile submarines:
Alameda, Long Beach, and San Diego, California; Mayport, Florida; Newport, Rhode Island; and Norfolk, Virginia (Cochran et al., 1983).
(See Fig. 2-12. ) Attacks on these bases would result in substantial numbers of fa talities in nearby urban areas.
In his 1974 briefing, Schlesinger presented an estimate of 250,000 fatalities resulting from an explosion of a one megaton warhead over four of the above ten naval bases (see Table 2 -1).
The assumed height-of-burst was not given. Fig. 2-12 . Locations of the major bases in the continental U.S. out of which nuclear-armed naval ships operate. We have estimated the number of civilian fa talities-from the blast and fallout-that would result from an attack on each of the ten conti nental nuclear navy bases. A fallout program pro vided by the Federal Emergency Management Admini stration was adapted for this purpose (Schmidt, Jr., 1975). A one megaton ground-burst was assum ed as well as the most pessimistic distribution of fallout protection factors used in the DOD's cal culations (U.S. Sen. For. Rel. Comm., 1975). Several "typical" winds-March, June, and August-were used (Defense Communications Agency, 1981), resulting in a range of expected fatalities due to fallout.
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Our results are given in Table   2 -1 .
Total fatalities in the areas surrounding the ten naval bases were estimated to be 0.5 -2.1 million.
The contribution due to fallout varied from less than a third to nearly all of the total, depending upon the winds.
"Typical March winds" gave the lowest estimates while "typical August winds" yielded the highest.
In those cases where a DOD estimate was made (Charleston, Long Beach, Norfolk, and San Diego), the DOD figure lies near the bottom or below the fatality range that we calculated.
In a 1980 NATO war game designated "Operation Squareleg" it was assumed that U.S. and British missile submarine bases in Scotland would be at tacked with ground-bursts of not one megaton, but 5-megaton warheads (Campbell, 1981) . Our prelimi nary calculations show that the casualties result ing from a similar attack on the nuclear navy bases in the U.S. would be several times higher than in the one megaton case. The total number of fatalities due to blast alone would rise from 340 to 990 thousand.
Attacks on Nuclear Warning, Communications, Command, and Defense Facilities
In order to disrupt if not prevent a U.S. nuclear response, the highest-priority targets of a Soviet attack on the U.S. strategic nuclear sys tem would be U.S. early warning systems, the com mand centers that would issue the orders for U.S. nuclear weapons use, and the communication systems that would transmit these orders.2 Presumably, an attempt would be made to destroy U.S. strategic defensive systems as well.
As a result of such considerations, Berman and Baker (1982) list, in addition to nuclear delivery systems and their local launch-control facilities, the following "nuclear threat targets" for Soviet interconti nental forces: amount of destruction that the U.S. could inflict on the cities and industry of the Soviet Union as a function of the "equivalent megatonnage"3 of nuclear warheads used.
An interpolation of the results (McNamara, 1968) gives the curves shown in Fig. 2-13 .
No explanation was given in McNamara's report about the assumptions used in calculating these results.
In the case of population, however, a reasonable guess can be hazarded on the basis of a comparison of the "assured destruction" curve in Fig. 2-13, which shows cumulative Soviet fatalities as a function of equivalent megatons used, with the curve in Fig. 2-14 In Hiroshima, however, the equivalent area of death was approximately equal to the area subject ed to an overpressure greater than 5 psi (von Hippel, 1983). If this criterion had been used in the calculations done for McNamara, the megaton nages shown along the horizontal axis of Fig. 2-14 would be lower by a factor of 5 for ground-bursts and up to a factor of 12 for air-bursts.
Thus, the use of an equivalent area of death scaled from that at Hiroshima would, for example, lead to a a The "equivalent megatonnage" of a nuclear weapon scales in the same way as the area that it can subject to more than a given peak blast over pressures as the two-thirds power of the mega tonnage . 
MINIMUM BLAST OVERPRESSURE (psi)
1 exposure of the U.S. population to peak blast attack shown in Fig.  et al., 1976 ).
2-16 and in the absence of
Soviet ballistic missiles carried single war heads. Since the scenario was devised, many of these missiles have been replaced with missiles carrying multiple independently-targetable war heads.
In terms of both total and equivalent megatonnage (6560 and 3300 respectively), however, the attack is still physically possible (see Fig.  2-15 ) and does, according to FEMA (1979) , cover the highest priority U.S. targets. Fig. 2-17 shows the estimate in the Oak Ridge report of the distribution of overpressures to which the U.S. population would be subject in the absence of urban evacuation. Fig. 2-18 shows the corresponding distribution of radiation doses from fallout for an unsheltered population with and without urban evacuation.
It was assumed that 77 percent of the total megatonnage in the attack would be ground-burst on military and industrial targets and that the winds would be blowing due east at 40 kilometers per hour.
The conversion between the "unit-time refer ence doses" shown in Fig. 2-18 and the peak equivalent residual doses that parameterize the fa tality curves in Fig. 2-6 tended "collateral effects" of attacks aimed at purely military targets.
The above discussion shows, however, that for the types of limited nuclear attacks most fre quently discussed, the number of unintentional civilian fatalities would be so huge as to render meaningless any military benefits achieved by the attacker.
Furthermore, the infliction of such high casualties would surely compound other already enormous pressures to move up the nuclear ladder. By the time strategic exchanges were occurring, there would be little remaining distinction be tween the civilian consequences of an attack di rected at purely military targets and those of an attack deliberately aimed at civilians.
It is also likely, however, that by this time all cen tral control over the targeting of nuclear weapons would have been lost in any case [Bracken, 1983] .
Clearly the short-term civilian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons will be an important factor in the determination of subsequent events in any future nuclear war.
As such, they should be taken fully into account along with broader en vironmental effects by serious nuclear planners and strategists.
The result is likely to be a more conservative assessment of the utility of nuclear weapons and the degree to which we should rely on them for our security.
